Interpretation of Anumāna in the Nyāya Sūtra

Elucidating the way anumāna is interpreted in Nyāya Sūtra predictably demonstrates that texts of this genre specificity in the history of Indian philosophy are traditionally the basis of a holistic oral tradition, so they leave more questions than answers out of the context of commentatory literature. Separating the original foundations of Nyaya teachings from further layers of interpretation and explanation is not devoid of value and meaning, because it allows to more deeply reveal not only the foundations of discussions that took place between Indian thinkers, but also to take a critical view of interpretive clichés in the tradition of Western studies. Anumāna is one of the pramāṇas that is only possible after pratyakṣa and based on it. In this context we define Pramāṇa as a cognitive situation, which can be a condition for obtaining reliable knowledge (jñāna). The priority, according to the discussion presented in Nyāya Sūtra between naiyayikas and their opponents, is to compare the definition of anumāna with other pramāṇas. Anumāna and pramāṇa śabda are the knowledge (jñāna) of what is available only indirectly, but the naiyayikas reject the offer of opponents to combine them into one. We can assume that one of the key reasons for anumāna’s rejection of śabda is the nonverbal nature of this pramāṇa. Anumāna is revealed verbally in avayavin, but their meaning should not be identified. The first part of Nyāya Sūtra does not specify whether the involvement of manas and ātman in pratyakṣa and anumāna is attributable. However, based on etymological analysis and from the subsequent context of the development of Nyaya teaching and their polemics with opponents, we can assume that supporters of this Darshan postulated the need for their participation in cognition. The first two of the three varieties of anumāna listed in Nyāya Sūtra are often interpreted by researchers as being based on the relationship between cause and effect, where the сognizant and the mediator of cognition are either cause or effect, respectively. However, such a guide, in the context of this study, seems vulnerable and imperfect. It is more justified to say that the three varieties of anumāna in the Nyāya Sūtra are defined according to the “temporal” location of the cognizable in relation to the “mediator” acquired in pratyakṣa: either before, or after, or at the same time. Based on the analysis of Nyāya Sūtra, anumāna is defined as a situation where, through the mediation of what is directly known in pratyakṣa, the knowledge (jñāna) inaccessible to indriya occurs at the moment of the act of perception of a certain artha. Due to the openness of the question about the role of the word in anumāna, the translation of this pramāṇa with the Ukrainian term umovyvid (inference) seems vulnerable and incorrect. Instead, we can either recognize this Sanskrit term as untranslatable and use transcription, or translate it with the term “conclusion”.