<i>What’s Wrong with Lookism? Personal Appearance, Discrimination, and Disadvantage</i>

Lookism is a topic that philosophers have been eerily silent about. Some notable exceptions notwithstanding, it seems that some philosophers either have personal looks as a blind spot in their thinking or simply do not deem it a relevant topic for systematic philosophical inquiry. But given that race and gender receive so much attention in social philosophy, it is an increasingly notable omission that looks are so underappreciated, given that looks, like race and gender, arguably determine one’s social life in significant ways. In this relatively sparse landscape, Andrew Mason has now published what is one of the first monograph-length philosophical reflections on looks and lookism. Part 1 deals with the nature of what makes discrimination wrong, part 2 considers three different contexts of lookism, and part 3 addresses possible strategies for ameliorating the negative societal effects of lookism.Part 1 espouses Mason’s preferred (meta)ethical framework of what makes something wrong. Mason opts for a pluralist account that allows for something to be wrong for either contingent or noncontingent reasons. Discrimination is noncontingently wrong iff it is wrong irrespective of its causal consequences. Discrimination is contingently wrong iff it is wrong in virtue of its causal consequences (i.e., it has unjust effects). Mason suggests that lookism can be wrong for either type of reason in what he calls a pluralist account. The two main noncontingent features that make discrimination wrong lie in its constituting disrespect and deliberative unfairness. The main contingent wrong associated with discrimination lies in “contributing to lowering the perceived moral standing of members of a group” (70). Mason’s approach then consists in teasing out the wrongness of lookism by finding noncontingent and contingent wrongs it incurs.Part 2 applies the views developed in part 1 about the wrongness of discrimination to three different contexts of lookism: the workplace, personal relationships, and everyday lookism. Mason suggests that appearance discrimination—at least in the workplace—is like racial discrimination in certain respects. In particular, since many parts of our appearance are as immutable as our race, “some of what is classed as racial discrimination is a distinctive kind of discrimination on the basis of appearance” (73). But racial discrimination and appearance discrimination are unlike one another insofar as not all cases of appearance discrimination seem to deny the fundamental moral equality of people. As for personal relationships, Mason argues that the wrongness of appearance discrimination lies in the following aspects: in reducing other people to their appearance if one deems their looks below a certain threshold, and that being the only factor in one’s partner selection; in denying someone access to goods that figure as the result of a personal relationship; and inflicting negative consequences on someone by lowering their moral status. Regarding everyday lookism, the relevant wrongs are in the victims being demeaned; in the added costs for people having to adjust their looks to meet certain standards; and in instances of psychological suffering of the victims (e.g., poor self-image).Part 3 suggests possible interventions to appearance discrimination—namely, legal means (e.g., outlawing appearance discrimination in some contexts) and interpersonal forms of amends (outside of the legal system). Unsurprisingly, Mason argues that there ought to be relatively thorough legal influence on employment discrimination based on appearance. Legal methods may consist in prevention and compensation. Mason argues that, in general, compensation is an inadequate response to appearance discrimination, such that our societal focus ought to be on prophylaxis through legislation. He suggests that such legislation can be reasonably modeled after existing legislation that prohibits discrimination in terms of disability. Mason, however, acknowledges that legislation against lookism in personal relationships is likely equally as futile as attempting to legislate, say, rules for friendship with others in terms of race and gender, which would most likely encroach on one’s right to privacy (197). However, Mason also suggests a Dworkin-type hypothetical insurance model that can be used to compensate individuals who suffer from appearance discrimination—for example, by funding plastic surgery, perhaps.Mason’s overall account of lookism is tightly argued and comprehensive, an achievement that is amplified considering the relative dearth of already existing scholarly debate on the topic that one could usually use to structure one’s account. But these are areas that I would have wanted Mason to explore more. These are not ‘knock-down’ arguments against his views but rather suggestions for future clarification.The Private as Political? I wonder whether the principled distinction between private and professional spheres really exists in the way that Mason seems to assume throughout the book. Work life and social life can often not neatly be distinguished. By the same token, looks work as a social ‘lubricant’ in professional settings just as much as in private settings. Hard-skill-related competence is not the only thing that is relevant in an office job; charisma—which usually cannot be fully distinguished from looks—is often just as important in many professions.When Looks Are the Point. In some work environments, looks are the point of employment, not just a side phenomenon. For example, while many would agree race plays virtually no role, by itself, in work performance, the point of being a professional model usually lies in the looks of the person. As far as I can tell, Mason is not overly concerned with such cases. But it may be the case that his account implies duties for either corporations or private customers hiring models. Even if Mason’s account holds up for the cases he envisions (employment and private interaction), it does not seem to apply to cases where having certain looks is the point. Mason may likely rebut that such cases would not constitute wrongs because they do not involve disrespect or unfairness. One possible problem here is that granting model agencies the right to discriminate in terms of looks also opens the door for other forms of discrimination. The people selecting models for the agency may have implicit bias that makes them judge Black people on average as less attractive, resulting in them hiring few or no Black people. Overall, it seems that circumstances where looks are the point include a degree of subjectivity of selection that makes it at least difficult to determine whether disrespect or deliberative unfairness is involved. It is at least difficult to see why models agencies being free to hire based on standards of beauty that are largely opaque does not create unjust effects as a result of deliberative unfairness. Analogously, we are often more inclined to grant that companies hiring for a position based on similarly opaque standards at least potentially involves unjust effects.Which Cases Are Relevant? Some of Mason’s core cases (106) and key cases (107–109) may prove to be inapt insofar as it is questionable whether they are really related to appearance. Most notably, some of the cases may be cases not of appearance discrimination but rather of sex or religious preferences. The case in which a female patient prefers a female doctor is rather a case of sex discrimination (or a benign preference). In some hiring scenarios involving a woman who wears a hijab, the decision to hire (or not hire) her might not hinge specifically on the fact that she wears a headscarf. The relevant people may have an issue with certain religions (for example, the three Abrahamic religions) themselves. This would not meet the criteria for unjust discrimination regarding appearance although appearance is involved. Mason goes on to sort such core and key cases into legitimate and illegitimate, but my point here is that whether such cases are legitimate discrimination is sometimes not a matter of appearance at all. Because people are embodied, their appearances signal visible features aside from their looks—for instance, their race, sex, or religion. And so a Hijabi woman could suffer religious discrimination because of her (visible) headscarf without suffering lookism per se.Alternative Approaches. Mason mainly seems to assume a consequentialist framework in his considerations. This is not necessarily a limitation, but the book would have benefited from some further justification as to why consequentialist approaches are (presumably) more fruitful than deontological or virtue theorist approaches. In particular, remedies or future prophylaxis against appearance discrimination could prominently feature virtue ethical considerations about duties to foster attitudes of not caring about other people’s looks.Extreme Ugliness. The most common form of lookism is directed upon what we may call conventionally unattractive people: people who are just not good looking, but nothing out of the ordinary. The most extreme case Mason considers is about a hard-to-look-at lawyer with facial scarring. There are, however, certain hard cases that Mason’s account may not cover. One sort of case is extreme facial disfigurement. Some survivors of horrific accidents or attacks, or people with rare genetic disorders, are often so difficult to look at—no matter how much one tries to be nondiscriminatory—that we cannot help but prefer others. If ought implies can, then there cannot be a duty to not discriminate against people with extreme facial disfigurement, at least in cases such as dating, romance, or close personal friendship. In such cases, the subjectively felt horror at their appearance may win out against one’s good-natured attitude toward others. But it is an interesting and important question to consider what, if anything, we ought to do in such cases.Difficult Cases. Mason discussion includes relatively ‘mundane’ instances of appearance discrimination regarding tattoos and piercings. But there are also related difficult cases. For example, think about someone with extremely ‘problematic’ tattoos: someone who has a visible swastika tattoo or someone who has genitals tattooed on their forehead. Suppose further that they are by miles the most qualified worker for a certain position. Is it still acceptable to exclude them from this opportunity? Similarly, in some cases of extreme body modification, people cut off their noses or implant or put subdermal implants into their foreheads to mimic the appearance of horns. Body modifications of this kind are sometimes executed with the goal of scaring or intimidating others. In some cases, it may be necessary for one’s own well-being to avoid people with certain extreme body modifications. To be sure, I am not blaming Mason for not having considered these cases extensively; they just pose a different kind of problem his views can be tested against.Mason’s book is an enormous step into the right direction and is sure to provide the foundation for future works on normative aspects pertaining to human looks and looks-based discrimination. It is rigorous, clear, and principled in the best way possible. I recommend this book as an important resource for anyone working in normative ethics, political philosophy, or aesthetics.