Animals as Subjects or Citizens: Can Animals have rights without duties?

In this paper I will review one of the prevailing arguments used to refute that animals can be considered subjects of rights—that animals cannot be subjects of rights because they cannot assume duties. The canonical way to respond to this question is to appeal to the arguments of “species overlap” (i.e. there are humans without certain abilities that are nonetheless subject of rights); and the “moral relevance” argument (highlighting the irrelevance of that incapability to gain right’s protection). At the legal level, both arguments suggest that de facto incapacity to assume obligations is not an obstacle to being a subject of rights (at least in matters involving humans). Although obviously flawed, the argument from obligations persists in rulings and doctrine. In this paper, I will take a critical look at the obligations argument and propose that the best way to address the argument is to examine the political theory that supports it. That political theory will be evaluated in light of Donaldson and Kymlicka’s proposal of citizenship for other animals whereby the authors argue that animals can and do fulfill some obligations in today’s interspecies societies.