Algorithms to the Rescue: Market Mechanisms for Consensual Trading of Unbiased Individual Data

This paper proposes a novel algorithmic market mechanism to address key challenges in individual data markets. Current data collection practices lack transparency and proper compensation, leading privacy-conscious users to opt out and creating biased data sets. Our proposed mechanism enables an intermediary platform to obtain unbiased samples of individual-level data while appropriately compensating users for privacy loss. Through theoretical analysis and simulations using both synthetic and real-world data sets, the authors demonstrate that their mechanism provides unbiased data samples at near-optimal cost compared with benchmark approaches. The mechanism outperforms both fixed-compensation methods and centralized-optimization approaches, even when platforms have partial information about user privacy preferences. Surprisingly, platforms achieve better outcomes by using this market mechanism rather than relying on estimated privacy preferences from user behavior. The approach is practical to implement, using straightforward sampling and conventional compensation mechanisms rather than complex techniques, like differential privacy. The mechanism enables creation of effective data markets that benefit both data subjects and buyers while ensuring compliance with regulations requiring transparency and consent. The findings are particularly relevant as new privacy regulations emerge globally and third-party tracking faces increased constraints, providing a viable solution for improving data quality and fairness in digital markets.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Information Systems Research
Published
2025-03-25
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2024.1115
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Auction Theory and Applications
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.11
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Algorithms to the Rescue: Market Mechanisms for Consensual Trading of Unbiased Individual Data

Hooman Hidaji, Raymond A. Patterson, Ashkan Eshghi, B. G. Birkhead et al.
1 citations
Information Systems Research
Auction Theory and Applications
2.11
article

Algorithms to the Rescue: Market Mechanisms for Consensual Trading of Unbiased Individual Data

Hooman Hidaji, Raymond A. Patterson, Ashkan Eshghi, B. G. Birkhead, Ram D. Gopal
article en
1 citations

Abstract

This paper proposes a novel algorithmic market mechanism to address key challenges in individual data markets. Current data collection practices lack transparency and proper compensation, leading privacy-conscious users to opt out and creating biased data sets. Our proposed mechanism enables an intermediary platform to obtain unbiased samples of individual-level data while appropriately compensating users for privacy loss. Through theoretical analysis and simulations using both synthetic and real-world data sets, the authors demonstrate that their mechanism provides unbiased data samples at near-optimal cost compared with benchmark approaches. The mechanism outperforms both fixed-compensation methods and centralized-optimization approaches, even when platforms have partial information about user privacy preferences. Surprisingly, platforms achieve better outcomes by using this market mechanism rather than relying on estimated privacy preferences from user behavior. The approach is practical to implement, using straightforward sampling and conventional compensation mechanisms rather than complex techniques, like differential privacy. The mechanism enables creation of effective data markets that benefit both data subjects and buyers while ensuring compliance with regulations requiring transparency and consent. The findings are particularly relevant as new privacy regulations emerge globally and third-party tracking faces increased constraints, providing a viable solution for improving data quality and fairness in digital markets.

Information Systems ResearchVol. 36(4)
University of Calgary (CA), University of Warwick (GB)
Openalex Percentile: Top 15%
Auction Theory and Applications
2.11
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Algorithms to the Rescue: Market Mechanisms for Consensual Trading of Unbiased Individual Data — Hooman Hidaji, Raymond A. Patterson, et al. · Information Systems Research (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS