Evolutionary Game Analysis of Empowering SMEs’ Digital Transformation by Core Manufacturing Enterprises Under Government Subsidies

To effectively address the dual challenges of insufficient motivation for digital transformation (DT) among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and low collaboration efficiency in the manufacturing supply chain within the context of the digital economy, this paper focuses on how government subsidy policies can promote the empowerment behavior of core manufacturing enterprises (CMEs) to resolve the DT difficulties of SMEs and drive the overall upgrade of the manufacturing industry. Based on evolutionary game theory, a three-party evolutionary game model involving the government, CMEs, and SMEs is constructed. The evolutionary stability strategies of the three parties under different scenarios are explored, and the evolutionary stability of system strategies under single-factor and two-factor interactions is analyzed through MATLAB simulations. The research results indicate that (1) the intensity of government subsidies shows an inverted U-shaped impact on their effectiveness. (2) The government subsidy to CMEs can not only directly incentivize empowerment but also indirectly promote the DT of SMEs. (3) CMEs converge to the empowerment strategy faster than SMEs, while SMEs are more sensitive to insufficient subsidies. (4) SMEs have weak self-transformation capabilities, and their willingness to undergo DT is significantly more influenced by external factors than by internal factors. The above findings can help to clarify the interactive relationships among the government, CMEs, and SMEs in the DT process and provide valuable suggestions from multiple perspectives to promote the SMEs’ DT.