A Stackelberg Game Model for Photovoltaic and Energy Storage Charging Station Groups Participate in the Day-Ahead Electrical Market

To enhance the revenue of charging stations participating in the electricity market, this paper establishes a model for photovoltaic and energy storage charging stations (PECS) and electric vehicles (EVs) to participate in market transactions through a leader-follower game in the day-ahead electricity spot market. During the market's pre-clearance period t, the charging station, as the upper-level leader, references the pre-clearance electricity price and adjusts the internal photovoltaic and energy storage output through the game to maximize the utility function of revenue. The lower-level follower EV adjusts the electricity purchase quantity based on the selling price, considering the user's willingness to participate, with the utility function of minimizing charging costs. After the game reaches equilibrium, PECS reports the final electricity purchase and sale quantity to the electricity trading center, completing the formal clearance of the day-ahead market at time T (T > t), Through the reasonable design of the example, the final simulation results prove that after the game, the participation in the market clearance improves the operational revenue of the charging station and reduces the charging cost of electric vehicles, achieving the optimization of mutual interests.

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Publication Details

Published
2024-10-25
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/appeec61255.2024.10922457
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.21
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article

A Stackelberg Game Model for Photovoltaic and Energy Storage Charging Station Groups Participate in the Day-Ahead Electrical Market

Haiping Liang, Jinying Wang
1 citations
Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure
0.21
article

A Stackelberg Game Model for Photovoltaic and Energy Storage Charging Station Groups Participate in the Day-Ahead Electrical Market

Haiping Liang, Jinying Wang
article en
1 citations

Abstract

To enhance the revenue of charging stations participating in the electricity market, this paper establishes a model for photovoltaic and energy storage charging stations (PECS) and electric vehicles (EVs) to participate in market transactions through a leader-follower game in the day-ahead electricity spot market. During the market's pre-clearance period t, the charging station, as the upper-level leader, references the pre-clearance electricity price and adjusts the internal photovoltaic and energy storage output through the game to maximize the utility function of revenue. The lower-level follower EV adjusts the electricity purchase quantity based on the selling price, considering the user's willingness to participate, with the utility function of minimizing charging costs. After the game reaches equilibrium, PECS reports the final electricity purchase and sale quantity to the electricity trading center, completing the formal clearance of the day-ahead market at time T (T > t), Through the reasonable design of the example, the final simulation results prove that after the game, the participation in the market clearance improves the operational revenue of the charging station and reduces the charging cost of electric vehicles, achieving the optimization of mutual interests.

North China Electric Power University (CN)
Affordable and clean energy
Openalex Percentile: Top 43%
Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure
0.21
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