The Cognitive-Motor Interference (CMI) in Terms of Embodied Cognition

Cognitive-motor interference (CMI), described as being produced by the simultaneous performance of a cognitive and a motor task, has recently been proposed as a marker of real-life impairment in people with neurodegenerative diseases and post-stroke conditions. However, the very notion of CMI seems to be strongly embedded in the Cartesian dualistic framework, introducing an ontological bias that may yield superficial or even artificial research findings. In this meta-theoretical context, we propose to reconceptualize the notion of CMI in terms of embodied cognition (EC). Drawing from three theoretical approaches: 1) the concept of pre-reflective intentionality in phenomenology, 2) the premotor theory of attention (PToA) in cognitive neuroscience, and 3) the action-sentence compatibility effect (ACE) in experimental psychology, we outline a perspective described as the “spatial intentions interference effect.” By doing so, we hope to provide a more nuanced view of the research results obtained thus far in CMI studies and to establish a framework for its application in therapeutic interventions for neurodegenerative diseases and post-stroke rehabilitation.