Analysis of the tripartite stochastic evolutionary game in the reverse supply chain of new energy vehicle power batter

In order to promote the efficient recycling and reuse of new energy vehicle power batteries, this paper applies stochastic evolution game theory to study the evolution results of the game strategies of the government, power battery recyclers, and echelon utilization enterprises in the reverse supply chain of power batteries, as well as the key factors affecting recycling. The results show that: the noise intensity of random perturbation affects the three parties in the game to varying degrees, with the echelon utilization enterprises being the most sensitive; moderate subsidies and moderate fines are both restrictive, and subsidies show more effective promotion than fines; the power battery recyclers and the echelon utilization enterprises have different sensitivities to changes in revenues, with the echelon utilization enterprises being more sensitive and requiring higher revenues to maintain their own development; when the risk of information sharing loss exceeds a certain threshold, the government's regulation of power battery recyclers and echelon utilization enterprises is ineffective, and both parties will not change their strategies and will choose to actively take responsibility; when the incentive gain of information sharing exceeds a certain threshold, it will reduce the motivation of power battery recyclers to take responsibility.