The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as a multilateral negotiation

Abstract This article applies multilateral negotiation theory (especially the role of the state and coalition formation) to the negotiation process for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) which was signed in November 2020. Until now, RCEP negotiations have been analysed as competitive leadership contest between China and Japan that took place in the context of the US-China rivalry. However, there are limits to what can be learned by treating the RCEP agreement as nothing more than the product of negotiations within an oppositional structure. To begin with, Japan’s trade policies remain mercantilistic, and Asia’s regionalism is still weakly institutionalized. In other words, participants in RCEP talks had goals other than greatly liberalizing trade and institutionalizing the regional framework. In addition, the RCEP negotiations ground to a halt when Japan and China were unable to garner sufficient support by using coercive leadership. When Japan and China switched to applying shared leadership based on acceptance of certain protectionist policies, they increased their support among other nations and an agreement was reached.