PBP: Post-training Backdoor Purification for Malware Classifiers

In recent years, the rise of machine learning (ML) in cybersecurity has brought new challenges, including the increasing threat of backdoor poisoning attacks on ML malware classifiers.These attacks aim to manipulate model behavior when provided with a particular input trigger.For instance, adversaries could inject malicious samples into public malware repositories, contaminating the training data and potentially misclassifying malware by the ML model.Current countermeasures predominantly focus on detecting poisoned samples by leveraging disagreements within the outputs of a diverse set of ensemble models on training data points.However, these methods are not suitable for scenarios where Machine Learningas-a-Service (MLaaS) is used or when users aim to remove backdoors from a model after it has been trained.Addressing this scenario, we introduce PBP, a post-training defense for malware classifiers that mitigates various types of backdoor embeddings without assuming any specific backdoor embedding mechanism.Our method exploits the influence of backdoor attacks on the activation distribution of neural networks, independent of the trigger-embedding method.In the presence of a backdoor attack, the activation distribution of each layer is distorted into a mixture of distributions.By regulating the statistics of the batch normalization layers, we can guide a backdoored model to perform similarly to a clean one.Our method demonstrates substantial advantages over several state-of-the-art methods, as evidenced by experiments on two datasets, two types of backdoor methods, and various attack configurations.Our experiments showcase that PBP can mitigate even the SOTA backdoor attacks for malware classifiers, e.g., Jigsaw Puzzle, which was previously demonstrated to be stealthy against existing backdoor defenses.Notably, our approach requires only a small portion of the training data -only 1% -to purify the backdoor and reduce the attack success rate from 100% to almost 0%, a 100-fold improvement over the baseline methods.Our code is available at https: //github.com/judydnguyen/pbp-backdoor-purification-official.

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Publication Details

Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2025.240603
Citations
3
Primary Topic
Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
4.46

Funders

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article

PBP: Post-training Backdoor Purification for Malware Classifiers

Kevin Leach, Taylor T. Johnson, Ngoc Tran, Dung Thuy Nguyen
3 citations
Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
4.46
article

PBP: Post-training Backdoor Purification for Malware Classifiers

Kevin Leach, Taylor T. Johnson, Ngoc Tran, Dung Thuy Nguyen
article en
3 citations

Abstract

In recent years, the rise of machine learning (ML) in cybersecurity has brought new challenges, including the increasing threat of backdoor poisoning attacks on ML malware classifiers.These attacks aim to manipulate model behavior when provided with a particular input trigger.For instance, adversaries could inject malicious samples into public malware repositories, contaminating the training data and potentially misclassifying malware by the ML model.Current countermeasures predominantly focus on detecting poisoned samples by leveraging disagreements within the outputs of a diverse set of ensemble models on training data points.However, these methods are not suitable for scenarios where Machine Learningas-a-Service (MLaaS) is used or when users aim to remove backdoors from a model after it has been trained.Addressing this scenario, we introduce PBP, a post-training defense for malware classifiers that mitigates various types of backdoor embeddings without assuming any specific backdoor embedding mechanism.Our method exploits the influence of backdoor attacks on the activation distribution of neural networks, independent of the trigger-embedding method.In the presence of a backdoor attack, the activation distribution of each layer is distorted into a mixture of distributions.By regulating the statistics of the batch normalization layers, we can guide a backdoored model to perform similarly to a clean one.Our method demonstrates substantial advantages over several state-of-the-art methods, as evidenced by experiments on two datasets, two types of backdoor methods, and various attack configurations.Our experiments showcase that PBP can mitigate even the SOTA backdoor attacks for malware classifiers, e.g., Jigsaw Puzzle, which was previously demonstrated to be stealthy against existing backdoor defenses.Notably, our approach requires only a small portion of the training data -only 1% -to purify the backdoor and reduce the attack success rate from 100% to almost 0%, a 100-fold improvement over the baseline methods.Our code is available at https: //github.com/judydnguyen/pbp-backdoor-purification-official.

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Advanced Research Projects Agency
Openalex Percentile: Top 6%
Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
4.46
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