Magmaw: Modality-Agnostic Adversarial Attacks on Machine Learning-Based Wireless Communication Systems
Machine Learning (ML) has been instrumental in enabling joint transceiver optimization by merging all physical layer blocks of the end-to-end wireless communication systems.Although there have been a number of adversarial attacks on ML-based wireless systems, the existing methods do not provide a comprehensive view including multi-modality of the source data, common physical layer protocols, and wireless domain constraints.This paper proposes Magmaw, a novel wireless attack methodology capable of generating universal adversarial perturbations for any multimodal signal transmitted over a wireless channel.We further introduce new objectives for adversarial attacks on downstream applications.We adopt the widely-used defenses to verify the resilience of Magmaw.For proof-of-concept evaluation, we build a real-time wireless attack platform using a software-defined radio system.Experimental results demonstrate that Magmaw causes significant performance degradation even in the presence of strong defense mechanisms.Furthermore, we validate the performance of Magmaw in two case studies: encrypted communication channel and channel modality-based ML model.Our code is available at https://github.com/juc023/Magmaw.
Authors
- Farinaz Koushanfar (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0798-3794)
- Jung-Woo Chang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2066-5937)
- Seira Hidano (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0006-0571-7168)
- Nasimeh Heydaribeni (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8097-9885)
- Ke Sun (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6263-7355)
- Xinyu Zhang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9688-8056)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-01-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2025.230336
- Citations
- 2
- Primary Topic
- Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 4.96
Funders
- U.S. Department of Defense