What makes a legislator promote or thwart trade liberalization in developing democracies?

Abstract This paper investigates how ideological polarization and constituency factors influence legislators’ voting behaviour on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). We explore the Chilean case, where trade policy has recently become highly politicized, to test three key relationships. First, we argue that right-wing legislators are more likely to champion FTAs when trade becomes a highly politicized issue, as the ratification of the CPTPP shows. Conversely, when trade is less politically salient, right-wing legislators are less likely to vote favourably for FTAs. Second, legislators representing regions with a high concentration of workers in tradable sectors are less likely to support trade liberalization, as it can put jobs at risk in their districts. Our results show that ideology explains legislators’ support to FTAs but only when the trade policy is politicized. Also, the probability of voting in favour of FTAs decreases as the proportion of workers in tradable sectors within the region increases. From a comparative perspective, the results highlight how the effect of politicization, observed mainly in European settings, is generalizable to a different set up: a presidential developing democracy.