A Secret Sharing-Inspired Robust Distributed Backdoor Attack to Federated Learning

Federated Learning (FL) is vulnerable to backdoor attacks—especially distributed backdoor attacks (DBA) that are more persistent and stealthy than centralized backdoor attacks. However, we observe that the attack effectiveness of DBA can be largely reduced when encountering rebels, i.e., the agents promising to perform the attack but do not do so. To robustify DBAs, we present SSRDBA , a secret sharing-inspired robust DBA to FL. To be specific, given a same global trigger as DBA, SSRDBA carefully divides it into different shares based on secret sharing and exploits these shares to poison local data on malicious devices, respectively. SSRDBA enjoys several merits, e.g., only partial malicious agents guarantee the reconstruction of the global trigger. Extensive experimental results show that SSRDBA is more robust to rebels than DBA and can evade the state-of-the-art FL defenses mainly for centralized backdoor attacks. To mitigate SSRDBA , we further design a novel defense mechanism, termed NFDR, which shows great potential against SSRDBA on certain independent identically distributed datasets.