The German Path to Fiscal Federalism

In accordance with the Imperial Constitution of 1871, the German Empire of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a federal state. The governments of the center (the Reich) and the federal states pursued a fiscal policy that had some features of “proto-competitive” federalism. Over the subsequent fifty years, however, German federalism evolved toward fiscal federalism. This transition was finally consolidated during 1919 and 1920 due to some endogenous factors and even more to exogenous ones. The article is based on statistical material as well as research from various studies, including those available from the library of the Goethe-Institut. The article compares the extent to which there were indications of proto-competitive federalism in the German budgetary system prior to Matthias Erzberger’s (finance minister of the German Empire) financial reforms (1919–1920) and indications of fiscal federalism after them. The transformation in both the distribution of power and responsibility as well as in provision of resources by various levels of the budgetary system to support those changes during the transition from proto-competitive to fiscal federalism is analyzed. The attempt to strike a balance between the fiscal interests of the center, federal states, and municipalities is explored; and equalization is singled out as a new function of the empire’s budget process. The creation of a so-called self-sufficient economy in the empire just before the First World War and its subsequent survival under pressure from sanctions and international isolation demanded a flexible balance between centralization and decentralization of spending powers along with an appropriate allocation of resources. Fiscal federalism through centralization of funds allowed Germany to begin recovery from geopolitical and socio-economic challenges, while maintaining decentralization primarily in non-tax revenues encouraged local governments to continue developing their economies. The logic derived from this historical study of the changing models of German fiscal federalism is also applicable to Russia: the reduction of revenues and growth of expenditures in the Russian Federation’s federal budget in recent years makes centralization of fiscal resources at the federal level more important, and the growth of expenditures in the regions and municipalities necessitates transfers and equalization measures.