A Defence of Structured Propositions

ABSTRACT Propositions are about things, i.e., for each proposition, there are some things that it is about. Propositions also represent, i.e., each proposition represents some thing or things to be some way. There is a debate about whether propositions are structured and have the things that they are about as their constituents, or simple. I argue that they are structured. I do this by arguing that some propositions are about things that they do not represent. This follows from two constraints on acceptable theories of propositions, which I state and defend. A familiar example of a structured theory can explain the fact that some propositions are about things that they do not represent. I argue that the theory can explain the fact because it says that propositions are structured. My example of a structured theory is a neo‐Russellian theory. The most prominent example of a simple theory cannot explain that fact, because it says that propositions are not structured. My example of a simple theory is Merricks' primitivist theory.