Moralische Verantwortung für fahrlässiges Handeln

Moral responsibility for an action can only be ascribed if it allows inferences about the agent. In cases of negligence, such a connection appears absent, as the agent acts in ignorance of readily accessible relevant facts. Yet, we hold individuals accountable for their negligent actions. The literature presents two approaches to resolve this apparent contradiction: Derivative theories trace neg- ligence back to prior culpable misconduct, while non-derivative theories view negligent actions as expressions of blameworthy attitudes. However, there are cases that neither approach can adequately explain. This paper aims to justify the appropriateness of moral blame even in these stubborn cases. Central to such a justification is the manner in which the ignorance arises. Often, it results from the violation of epistemic duties, which obligate us to maintain awareness of the consequences our actions have for others. This misconduct thus estab- lishes the necessary connection between the agent and the negligent action, providing a basis for attributing responsibility.