Can a Bayesian Oracle Prevent Harm from an Agent?

Is there a way to design powerful AI systems based on machine learning methods that would satisfy probabilistic safety guarantees? With the long-term goal of obtaining a probabilistic guarantee that would apply in every context, we consider estimating a context-dependent bound on the probability of violating a given safety specification. Such a risk evaluation would need to be performed at run-time to provide a guardrail against dangerous actions of an AI. Noting that different plausible hypotheses about the world could produce very different outcomes, and because we do not know which one is right, we derive bounds on the safety violation probability predicted under the true but unknown hypothesis. Such bounds could be used to reject potentially dangerous actions. Our main results involve searching for cautious but plausible hypotheses, obtained by a maximization that involves Bayesian posteriors over hypotheses. We consider two forms of this result, in the i.i.d. case and in the non-i.i.d. case, and conclude with open problems towards turning such theoretical results into practical AI guardrails.

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Publication Details

Journal
SuperIntelligence - Robotics - Safety & Alignment
Published
2025-03-05
DOI
https://doi.org/10.70777/si.v2i1.13799
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
3.25
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article

Can a Bayesian Oracle Prevent Harm from an Agent?

Michael K. Cohen, Mark McDermott, Younesse Kaddar, Nikolay Malkin et al.
1 citations
SuperIntelligence - Robotics - Safety & Alignment
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
3.25
article

Can a Bayesian Oracle Prevent Harm from an Agent?

Michael K. Cohen, Mark McDermott, Younesse Kaddar, Nikolay Malkin, Yoshua Bengio, Damiano Fornasiere, Pietro Greiner
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Is there a way to design powerful AI systems based on machine learning methods that would satisfy probabilistic safety guarantees? With the long-term goal of obtaining a probabilistic guarantee that would apply in every context, we consider estimating a context-dependent bound on the probability of violating a given safety specification. Such a risk evaluation would need to be performed at run-time to provide a guardrail against dangerous actions of an AI. Noting that different plausible hypotheses about the world could produce very different outcomes, and because we do not know which one is right, we derive bounds on the safety violation probability predicted under the true but unknown hypothesis. Such bounds could be used to reject potentially dangerous actions. Our main results involve searching for cautious but plausible hypotheses, obtained by a maximization that involves Bayesian posteriors over hypotheses. We consider two forms of this result, in the i.i.d. case and in the non-i.i.d. case, and conclude with open problems towards turning such theoretical results into practical AI guardrails.

SuperIntelligence - Robotics - Safety & AlignmentVol. 2(1)
University of Oxford (GB), Centre Universitaire de Mila (DZ), Chancellor University (US), Imperial College London (GB), Université de Montréal (CA), University of California, Berkeley (US), University of Edinburgh (GB)
Openalex Percentile: Top 10%
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
3.25
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Can a Bayesian Oracle Prevent Harm from an Agent? — Michael K. Cohen, Mark McDermott, et al. · SuperIntelligence - Robotics - Safety & Alignment (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS