Heidegger’s Appropriation of Husserl’s Categorial Intuition in his Interpretation of Kant

This article argues that Heidegger’s appropriation of Husserl’s categorial intuition is essential for his interpretation of Kant’s concepts of intuition and form of intuition. First, I analyze the two aspects of Heidegger’s interpretation of Husserl’s categorial intuition that are relevant to his reading of Kant, namely, his understanding of categorial intuition as fundamentally intertwined with sensible intuition and his understanding of the correlate of such an intuiting as already unthematically coapprehended in sensible intuition. Second, I show that Heidegger incorporates these two aspects into his reading of Kant’s concept of intuition as a “thinking intuition” and into his interpretation of the Kantian “form of intuition” as something unthematically intuited in every experience.