The Ontology of Virtual Objects in David Chalmers’ Concept of Virtual Realism

This article examines the ontological status of virtual objects in light of contemporary philosophical debates on virtual reality (VR). The main point of departure is an analysis of David Chalmers’ concept of “virtual realism”, which argues that virtual objects can be considered real because they meet fundamental criteria of reality such as existence, causal power, and non-illusoriness. Chalmers rejects positions that treat virtual objects as fictions or illusions, emphasizing their ability to elicit real effects and shape users’ experiences. Chalmers suggests an ontological equivalence between physical and virtual objects, raising questions about the nature of reality and the criteria for attributing it in the context of dynamic technological changes. In this work, I propose an alternative approach to the ontology of virtual objects, situating them within Karl Popper’s World III. Unlike traditional views that emphasize the digital nature of virtual objects, this perspective treats them as immaterial yet perceptible entities that acquire an autonomous status through their role in intersubjective and cultural processes. This approach refines the debate by offering a framework that distinguishes virtual objects from both physical and purely abstract entities. I argue that virtual objects, though immaterial, can be recognized as real entities due to their ability to generate real perceptual, emotional, and cognitive effects. This approach expands traditional understandings of ontology, offering new perspectives on the nature of reality in a digital context.