Game-based modeling of delayed risk contagion in cryptocurrency exchanges

Abstract During the last years, financial market contagion has become a critical concern for policymakers and investors, particularly with respect to the financial stability of cryptocurrency platforms. This paper explores the contagion effect among crypto exchanges employing the Susceptible–Infected–Recovered (SIR) model with time delay and investigates possible cooperative strategies. The SIR dynamical system is integrated with the replicator equation of evolutionary game theory to study the interplay between the spread of risk and the propensity of cryptocurrency platforms to become cooperative under the pressure of financial contagion. Different equilibrium points which correspond to both pure and mixed cooperative strategies characterize the resulting model. We carry out a theoretical analysis of the problem by studying the asymptotic behavior in the steady state. In addition, using extensive cryptocurrency market data from 2017 to 2023, we identify the key factors driving contagion and assess the dynamics of cooperative versus non-cooperative behavior. Our findings point out that cooperative strategies are essential to ensure financial stability, particularly in the long term, as they mitigate systemic risks and foster resilience. These results provide critical insights for policy makers and investors, offering actionable strategies to enhance the robustness of crypto markets and address the growing challenges of financial contagion in the digital asset ecosystem.