Knowledge, Tennis, and Objective List Accounts of Well-Being

Abstract This paper argues that objective list accounts of well-being cannot account for the fact that not all knowledge, an item typically on such lists, is good for people independently of their attitudes toward it. The most obvious way to distinguish that knowledge that is intrinsically valuable is precisely in terms of subjective attitudes and aims. Tennis is a source of well-being for me. It is not simply instrumentally valuable to me as a means to any usual member of objective lists. Since it is plausible to say that I play simply for the enjoyment, pleasure or enjoyment is the most likely member of objective lists under which to subsume tennis for me. But an analysis of the different types of pleasure shows that it is not what makes tennis valuable for me. It is intrinsically valuable to me in light of its intrinsic properties that attract me to it, although it is not valuable to many others. The objective list proponent cannot add new members, such as competition, play, or exercise of skill, to her list to which tennis is merely a means. Since it is not a means or instance to something that is good for all, it cannot be captured on any objective list.