Dignity as a concept for computer ethics

Abstract Since the Second World War, dignity has been the central concept for defining the indestructible intrinsic value of human beings. With the advent of ever-improving AI, the question is becoming urgent whether robots, computers, or other intelligent machines should be granted dignity and thus rights. Previous answers in the literature vary widely, ranging from the opinion that robots are mere things with no intrinsic value to the complete opposite—the demand that they be granted human rights. The reason for this disagreement is that experts in computer ethics use different conceptualizations of dignity. The aim of this article is to clarify the concept of dignity for computer ethics. Systematic literature research was carried out with a focus on very fundamental works on the concept of dignity. From this, components of human dignity were derived. All conceivable relevant components are listed and tested for applicability to robots or computers. Human dignity is based on a closed list of characteristics, including freedom and autonomy for moral responsibility (which includes consciousness and appropriate reactions), the capacity for suffering and respect, dignified behavior, individuality, and a few others. It is possible to apply them to robots, and if a robot has all these components, it is hard to see why he should not be granted dignity. Future discussions about the dignity of robots, computers and other intelligent machines will gain precision if they use a common, precise concept of dignity. An open question is what happens if machines have some but not all of the components of dignity.