*Reluctance to Downplay: Asymmetric Sensitivity to Differences in the Severity of Moral Transgressions

A common-sense moral intuition is that bad acts should be condemned according to severity. Yet seven experiments (<i>N</i> = 6,075 U.S. adults) show that the extent to which people differentiate between transgressions hinges on the direction of comparison. When scaling up from a less severe transgression to a more severe one, people readily express stronger condemnation of the worse transgression. But when scaling down from a more severe transgression to a less severe one, they differentiate less, often condemning the lesser transgression just as strongly as one that is transparently worse. Indicating that one transgression is less bad than another can be construed as downplaying such transgressions, signaling bad moral character. Supporting this account, the asymmetry is larger for judgments that implicate moral character and for transgressions that seem especially important to condemn. Observers' moral-character judgments reveal a similar pattern, suggesting that the asymmetry is reinforced by social incentives.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Psychological Science
Published
2025-03-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976251314972
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.86
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

*Reluctance to Downplay: Asymmetric Sensitivity to Differences in the Severity of Moral Transgressions

Ike Silver, Amanda E. Geiser, Deborah A. Small
2 citations
Psychological Science
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
2.86
article

*Reluctance to Downplay: Asymmetric Sensitivity to Differences in the Severity of Moral Transgressions

Ike Silver, Amanda E. Geiser, Deborah A. Small
article en
2 citations

Abstract

A common-sense moral intuition is that bad acts should be condemned according to severity. Yet seven experiments (<i>N</i> = 6,075 U.S. adults) show that the extent to which people differentiate between transgressions hinges on the direction of comparison. When scaling up from a less severe transgression to a more severe one, people readily express stronger condemnation of the worse transgression. But when scaling down from a more severe transgression to a less severe one, they differentiate less, often condemning the lesser transgression just as strongly as one that is transparently worse. Indicating that one transgression is less bad than another can be construed as downplaying such transgressions, signaling bad moral character. Supporting this account, the asymmetry is larger for judgments that implicate moral character and for transgressions that seem especially important to condemn. Observers' moral-character judgments reveal a similar pattern, suggesting that the asymmetry is reinforced by social incentives.

Psychological ScienceVol. 36(3)
University of Southern California (US), Yale University (US), University of California, Berkeley (US)
Reduced inequalities
Openalex Percentile: Top 11%
Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
2.86
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.