A Ship Power Sharing Strategy Based on Shapley Value Method and Cartel Mechanism

With the development of the maritime industry, the number and capacity of existing port cold-ironing (CI) equipment can no longer meet the power demand of ships during berthing, resulting in significant carbon emissions from ships within the port area. Therefore, a ship power sharing strategy based on Shapley value method and Cartel mechanism is proposed. Firstly, the rolling optimization model of ship power scheduling is established to adjust the ship power scheduling strategy according to the real-time information. Secondly, the cooperative game model of ship power sharing is established, and the cost sharing among cooperative ships is realized by Shapley value method. Finally, in order to reduce the situation that ships increase their own profits by deviating from cooperation and affect the overall profits, this paper introduces Cartel mechanism to punish the behavior of deviating from cooperation. The simulation results show that the power sharing strategy proposed in this paper can reduce the total ship cost and carbon emission by 5.28% and 3.78%, respectively. The introduction of Cartel mechanism can increase the cost of non-cooperative behavior, thus ensuring that all ships take cooperative behavior. The power sharing strategy based on Shapley method and Cartel mechanism proposed in this paper is helpful to the construction of green ports.