ICMarks: A Robust Watermarking Framework for Integrated Circuit Physical Design IP Protection
Physical design watermarking (WM) on contemporary integrated circuit (IC) layout encodes signatures without considering the dense connections and design constraints, which could lead to performance degradation on the watermarked products. This article presents <monospace xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">ICMarks</monospace>, a quality-preserving and robust WM framework for modern IC physical design. <monospace xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">ICMarks</monospace> embeds unique watermark signatures during the physical design’s placement stage, thereby authenticating the IC layout ownership. <monospace xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">ICMarks</monospace>’s novelty lies in 1) strategically identifying a region of cells to watermark with minimal impact on the layout performance and 2) a two-level WM framework for augmented robustness toward potential removal and forging attacks. Extensive evaluations on benchmarks of different design objectives and sizes validate that <monospace xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">ICMarks</monospace> incurs no wirelength and timing metrics degradation, while successfully proving ownership. Furthermore, we demonstrate <monospace xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">ICMarks</monospace> is robust against two major WM attack categories, namely, watermark removal and forging attacks; even if the adversaries have prior knowledge of the WM schemes, the signatures cannot be removed without significantly undermining the layout quality.
Authors
- David Z. Pan (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5705-2501)
- Farinaz Koushanfar (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0798-3794)
- Rachel Selina Rajarathnam (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6383-9709)
- Ruisi Zhang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9554-8073)
Institutions
- University of California San Diego (US)
- The University of Texas at Austin (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
- Published
- 2025-03-18
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/tcad.2025.3552503
- Citations
- 3
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 6.81