Expectativa volitiva y expectativa emocional: formas no dóxicas de anticipación del futuro en la fenomenología de Husserl

In manuscripts devoted to emotions and will published in the second and third volumes of the Studies on the Structure of Consciousness (XLIII/2-3), Husserl raises a pivotal question concerning the existence of a distinct and inherent form of expectation within emotion and willing (Hua XLIII/3, 285). Specifically, he introduces the terms “willing expectations” (Willenserwartungen) and “emotional expectations” (Gemütserwartungen), to describe a form of future-directedness that diverges from empirical and intellectual expectations, and which belong to the emotional sphere (Gemüt), broadly constructed. By delving into a selection of these manuscripts, this paper clarifies the meaning of these forms of anticipation of the future which involve an affective tension and a conception of the future as a practical horizon of realization of a goal. It also clarifies how these are different from what Husserl calls “intellectual (or theoretical) expectations” and empirically motivated expectations.