Cui bono? business elites and interstate conflict

We examine how regime support coalitions influence interstate conflict by revisiting the classic debate over the role of business elites in shaping states’ conflict behavior. While imperialist theories argue that business elites promote military expeditions to access new foreign markets, capitalist peace perspectives contend that these elites favor peace due to their economic interests. We reconcile these views by proposing that countries become more belligerent when business elites are part of their regime-support coalitions but only when their potential adversaries are not similarly supported by business elites. To test this argument, we use a novel dataset on the composition of regime support coalitions covering 200 polities over two centuries. Our findings indicate that regimes backed by business elites are more likely to initiate armed conflict but not against other countries with business-elite-supported regimes. In addition, we uncover that the aggressive tendencies of business-elite-supported regimes are moderated by pre-existing trade relationships. These results contribute to our understanding of how domestic elite groups shape international conflict, offering new insights into the interplay between economic interests and state behavior.