Relations as basic – the Bradleyan descent

I think both steps (1) and (2) of Della Rocca's argument are problematic as I will show in this paper: (1) treats relations as addenda to the relata which seem to exist independently of the relation. This is one way of thinking about relations – a way we will see very clearly also in Aristotle's account of relation. But it is by no means the only one as Della Rocca suggests for his argument; I will give several examples below of relations that cannot be thought along these lines. Subsequently, I will demonstrate problems with step (2), with the way in which Della Rocca gets the infinite regress going. This does not mean, however, that the core concern Della Rocca raises is not a real concern; it is in fact one dealt with in many debates about metaphysical foundationalism and coherentism. Before I demonstrate this descent of Bradley's regress, I will first stay on the positive side and show how the kind of relations Della Rocca sketches are indeed problematic and have been shown to be worrisome already in ancient times, starting from Parmenides. Della Rocca ties his argument against any distinctions to Parmenides and his monism, since a strict monism is the only position that, following Della Rocca's main argument, will ultimately be left for us. Parmenidean monism is based on his rejection of any distinctions. According to Della Rocca, this is in turn based on Parmenides' rejection of all forms of relations.5 The notion of relation is indeed a notion that is very problematic in ancient philosophy: Parmenides does not allow for any relations, and Plato and Aristotle point out problems with them. The main worry seems to be that if something is a relation or relational, then it seems to have only derivative existence, but no full being. We can see this in Plato's characterisation of Forms as being simple in itself while sensible things only exist in relation to Forms, or in Aristotle's account of accidentals, which can only exist in relation to some substance. Della Rocca stands in this long tradition of raising problems for the very notion of relation. Since Aristotle is the thinker who shows the problems relations may raise most explicitly, we can think of Della Rocca as an Aristotelian in this sense. However, like Aristotle, Della Rocca only takes certain kinds of relations into view which will turn out not all that there is to relations. But let us look at the problems Plato and Aristotle raise with respect to relations first. Plato, like Parmenides, attempts to conceive what truly is, for him the Forms, as possessing no complexity, no distinctions. For Plato there is, however, a plurality of what-is, of Forms, and so the freedom from distinctions only concerns each Form internally: each is of one kind (monoeidês), simple, not composed, and indivisible (see, for example, Phaedo 78b-d). The late Plato, however, changes this, as we can see in the Sophist. There he not only demonstrates that Parmenides has problems even formulating his position of monism (244c8-d9), but also that we have to think of what truly is as being internally complex and thus as containing some form of relation (in the so-called megista genê passage, Sophist 254c1-259d8). In the Euthydemus Plato plays with paradoxes we get into if we think of relations as simple properties6: the sophist Euthydemus shows, for example, that if we understand the relational predicate “being the father of y” (so a two-place relation “x is the father of y”) as a one-place predicate, simply as “being the father”, then we can derive from the claim that Michael Della Rocca is not the father of Socrates that he is no father full stop (poor Ben and Ethan Della Rocca). Today, we often do not strictly distinguish between relations and properties in that we take relations as objects of multi-place predicates or simple predicates as one place relations. But the problem the Platonic passage raises is still the same: understanding something multi-place as one-place means we loose the connection to the particular relatum to which the relation is tied.7 This is important since we will see below that there are in fact relations that are not tied to a particular relatum and are universal in this sense, but these are not the family relations discussed in the Euthydemus. In the Parmenides in the so-called “Greatest Difficulty” passage (133a-134e), Plato seems to distinguish between two ways of being, relative being and absolute being. Something has relative being if what it is, its nature, can only be determined with respect to something else. But if a Form is relative, it seems it could only be relative in relation to another Form, while sensible things can stand in relation only to other sensible things. Plato illustrates this point with the example of the master–slave relation: the “Form” of Slavery can only stand in a relation to the “Form” of Mastery, while a particular slave will only stand in a relation to a particular master.8 The upshot of this argument, the greatest difficulty for the theory of Forms as depicted so far in this dialogue, is that it seems no individual sensible thing can stand in a relation to a universal Form, and thus no participation relation seems to be possible. But it is of course the participation relation, the fact that sensible things participate for what they are in their respective Forms – a beautiful flower, for example, is beautiful because it participates in the Form of beauty – that seems to be a main reason for assuming Forms.9 What is more, according to this argument, our specific human acts of cognition can never cognize Forms, but only a specific individual thing. Thus Forms turn out to be unknowable for us, and gods who possess knowledge as such cannot know human affairs.10 What is important for our topic is that Plato here looks at relations as such – mastery or slavery as such – and clarifies that mastery as such only stands in relation to slavery as such, not to a specific slave; and a specific master is master not in relation to slavery as such, but to a specific slave. We get a clear linkage of specific relations with specific relata, universal ones with universal relata. The father example shows Plato discussing the fact that relations cannot be understood as one-place predicates and that a relation needs to be tied to a specific relatum – a father always has to be the father of somebody particular, such as Michael Della Rocca being the father of Ben and Ethan Della Rocca, otherwise we get into paradoxes. By contrast, an Aristotelian is interested in another aspect of such relations, namely that being a father is a mere accident, and does not yet specify what the thing talked about ultimately is11: Michael Della Rocca is first and foremost Michael Della Rocca, a human being, this is his substance; and only in addition is he a father. There was a time when he was not a father; being a father is temporal and metaphysically posterior for Aristotle, prior is him being a human being. (Furthermore, Michael Della Rocca may become part of a relation even if not doing anything, for example, if he were to become an uncle). What is relative (pros ti) is least of all categories a kind of nature or substance, and is posterior to quality and quantity. […] For there is nothing either great or small, many or few, or in general relative to something which is not (also) something else as which it then is great or small, many or few, or generally relative to something (1088a22-28).12 We see that according to Aristotle, whatever is relative to something is first and foremost something else. It has its own nature and, in addition, it is also relative to something else. Thus a relation is always derived from the relata. The relata have to be given in the first place in order for a relation to obtain; the relation can then be added or taken as the sum of the relata. This is the reason that for Aristotle relata are least of all true beings.13 Furthermore, it is rather loose if I talk about Aristotle's discussion of relation, since what he in fact talks about in his Categories as well as his Metaphysics is about what is pros ti, literally “what is with relation to something”, “what is relative”. Thus he is not talking about relations as such, but about the relata, what possesses a relation, the relative. In Metaphysics Delta 15 Aristotle distinguishes between different kinds of pros ti – a relative according to number (like half and double), or a relative of doing and having done (like cutting and being cut), or a relative in the sense of measure in relation to what is measured. Thinking of what is relative, rather than of relations also means that relations like “A > B” and “B < A” which are the same relation just expressed differently, are two different relations for Aristotle, one being the “bigger than”, the other the “smaller than” relation, similar to the “being half” and “being double” relation Aristotle discusses explicitly. This emphasis not on the relation but on the relatum, that is already expressed in the term “pros ti”, shows that Aristotle thinks of relations as something that is additively built, as a sum from its part: we start with some A that is of nature x and then turns out also to have a relation to B. This starting point from relata seems very close to what Della Rocca has in mind.14 Also Aristotle certainly makes Della Rocca's assumption (1) above (though he does not go on further to (2)). Aristotle's Categories show that what is relative is not only derivative for him but also problematic.15 There he defines the category of pros ti a second time, for the first definition ultimately extends into the category of substance (8a28ff.) and thus cannot be adequate.16 Aristotle not only lists master and slave as relatives there, but also knowledge and what is knowable; and he takes up the worry that second substances, i.e. kinds and genera, may seem to be relative. Relations like the ones we find in Aristotle (being a father, being double) are always tied to particular relata. These kind of relations are indeed dependent on their relata in the way Aristotle, Bradley, and Della Rocca suggest. There seem to be no general relations of these kinds, but only of specific relata. In this respect, Della Rocca seems to be like an ancient thinker, though not like Parmenides, but more like Aristotle. Relations like “being a father” is the kind of relation Della Rocca is talking about, but it is not all there is to relations. Hegel, who ironically was an important influence on Bradley, seems to be the first thinker to show clearly that there are other kinds of relations that cannot be thought of in an additive way such that we have A and B and in addition also the relation of A and B.17 The short sketch of Plato's and Aristotle's treatment of relations above shows that we need to get clearer first what is in fact understood by a relation here. Della Rocca seems to focus on relations A and B give since he treats as posterior to A and B. treats relations as as if as something that but need not be added to the relata A and B. the thought that relata A and B up to relation is the assumption that have so that we get as a mere of A and B. The the relation, is thought of as the sum of its There however, also relations A and B on their own do not give the the has the Furthermore, with the relation and all kinds of family relations the individual relata are important – we that if we Della Rocca will stop being a father. But there are other kinds of relations, the relata are not important and prior since different relata can be may think of such relations as universal in this and if I one relatum, its will simply In the following I will give several examples of relations that cannot be understood in the way Della Rocca relations, that is as an to its relata. In this way I will against step (1) of Della Rocca's We will see the not be what they are the relation so that it be to that the relation is in its relata or the relation is prior and different individual relata can be I will give examples to the way Della Rocca treats relations from the and – these are just the such examples to but there are many other examples in other the and most (though not for relations that do not the pros ti are certain kinds of family relations can be understood along the we it in Aristotle – we only have a relation of if there is a and a so we can this relation is in the two relata of and and they are a specific and a specific – there are relations things are It is in mere there is no as in the father we always have clear relata that we can independently of the relation. We all know the that we or somebody we know is a different if with A than with B. A may out the in and B the to this other does not seem to be something that the relata, and it the relata in such a way that they not be the same the relation – being with I cannot show For example, only if that is a may in fact be to like a relation and relata here seem to be at least We may think this is the same with the relation: Michael Della Rocca is also only a father in relation to Ben and Ethan Della Rocca and not in relation to any other However, here we can Michael and Ben and Ethan Della Rocca prior to about the between may know and not be that they are at all while there simply is no to is with a of relations may also be in of and the and is not the sum of each the and is not just an addition of the and of of the we not have to the or we get to in the if the not been in a but rather each done their on their in a the of the is not simply the same as the addition of all the any individual the is to the fact that A x just when B and and was by relations like the ones the individual A or B is still we may think we are simply with different of the same and that the relations discussed are still in this what the relatum is, is starting to in the of out the in and in the of we may still think that there is a core that we can as a relatum on which the relation In this way Della Rocca may still claim that relations are in these relata in the sense that there not be a relation the individual as relatum if their may be more than in the and the however, we will to also such a core of the relata, any individual relata only a full but any or in is not in individual as such, but rather in the relation of For example, if I just the on we cannot this as to any of but if we we know this is the of In by the Furthermore, a does not simply in and it is not simply in such as it on the order in which these – is a different order to and and a different What is more, in order to get the of In we do not even need these particular rather we can and and thus the a We could also it up or it in other ways who has to with a family that far than what the In all these we will still get the or of In as long as the between the different is the we cannot that the is in as what makes it the it is, is a a and a are thus a clear for relations that are not simply derivative of their relata. What is as is not so these but only the between them. The is not in any individual but in their The fact that the or is the but not the relata, we also find in the of more which us to the and the I will give two examples from and two from for relations that cannot be thought as derivative of their relata. In both I will give a more and a more In I will start with which is a topic for ancient I on to while in I will stay with when discussing I on to the understanding of in examples can only be very here. In and relations that can be by very different relata. According to a is the between two and and we with a in different have the same We this as the – the relata – are mere show that the individual is not only the is and this can of different with what is is not a specific from a and its specific in the but the fact that any number from the is tied to one in the For example, if we have the and we for we get as a for But it be to that this is in and These are just into the What is is the between any x and the thus a is a relation we can then in different relata. also are relations we on to we will stay first with in that we look at the way in which is determined this is one example for a complex that is, a that is the between two other simple time and We may think that this understanding of already shows that the simple and are the complex one of However, if we to the additive we in Aristotle and Della Rocca for an understanding of we will in fact not our understanding of For it is the between time and that has to be taken as as a example the of two different will let us Della Rocca and I to out who of us is the – he is doing his in I in let us Della Rocca in and I in In order to find out who of us is it is not to one relatum, time, and then the other relatum, For this only give us that it more time for but Della Rocca only at the relata will not us which of the two of us is when we look at the of time and in both thus that he while I do we in fact with and can – Della Rocca is we have to take into account the of time and and not simply each on its own which we then is an relational For our second example from we to the of we find relations as and objects as we find between such that two objects we always have We cannot which one possesses which but we measure one will take on a particular let us and then the other one takes on the positive What is important for us is that here we do not start out with objects possessing a particular it is not just a of us the which particular this we start out with a such that one of the has to have the of the but which particular to which one of the two is determined only in the far I have dealt with the first step that Della Rocca takes in his against relations, his assumption that relations are always in relata. We above that Della Rocca seems to such relations for his argument and out relations we know from or the the relations are more than their relata. We will how Della Rocca gets from the relation to the infinite regress and thus on to his second step Della Rocca that relation is in its relata, A and and thus stands itself in a relation to them. in turn is in its relata – A and B on the one and on the I do not see that Della Rocca clarifies what he by existence, metaphysical or or yet something seems to that a relation is in A and B not be there, in A and B were not and he seems to think of it as a metaphysical or relation. is a relation one of the relata, that which does the here A and is prior to the other relatum, to what is here this an relation for of By contrast, the relation we out with between A and B is and not tied to any kind of it a relation. some of the examples Della Rocca are indeed relations such that some is prior to some such as a substance being prior to its it is just that an relation has to be as a not only for other relations, but also for ones a more specific relation may be the for specific this as it what is important in the step here is that the two relations and are in fact very and it is how we get from to is a relation, while is an We can this point as that I relation and I yet but a relation and so I of that as one of the […] in of that I into existence, I not only that there first be another relatum of the relation but I also the – the relation – between and i.e. between and may also that there be a between the other relatum and the relation, not only on but also on the relation of between and as a relation by its very nature on its relata, so the relational at least in part on the fact that just as the relation between and certain on the relation of between and so the fact that and certain are in part on the that the fact that the fact – – that is to certain the fact that is to other that there be a of from the fact that to the fact that is to other In this way Della Rocca thinks we still get into a regress if we with rather than But what Della Rocca does as in his is to relations or relational as the same kind of as relata, be they objects or that there is no in the of relata and relations and thus the point of relations. It is only relations as the same kind of thing as their relata that Della Rocca to up another relation into the if a relation or relational fact is in fact or substance then it also on a relation a relational in addition to and But we only need another relation if we as being of the same kind as or in understanding as at least a or the a be otherwise the regress does not get This for another relation to the fact that our relation is like a relatum shows that Della Rocca is to his following the he is the what I Rocca's Della Rocca thinks that can only stop the regress by the in his against of the that to the regress argument will to in one way or i.e. will turn on the I do not think this is to his regress argument turns not on the but rather on out that relations cannot be thought in the same way as their relata can and that here the of to distinctions between different is the way to such a However, the concern Della Rocca to with his argument, namely the there is an for all the the or how to an is a real it is and in debates about foundationalism and coherentism. we ultimately have to something which is not in something but rather and if so how can we understand this we rather that all ultimately is done in one along the we find it in different of and for most in of We that the main argument of Della Rocca's that is at the of his rejection of any the regress against relations, is itself a problematic argument, since it treats relations in the same way as its relata and thus what is specific about relations. Della Rocca relations to be in relata, treats relations as in the same way as its relata, and thus a further relation for it to be in its relata. this further relation needs another relation of starting Furthermore, Della Rocca a particular kind of relation which can be along the of thinking about relatives that we in Aristotle. This is, however, by no means the only way to think about relations and out many relational and we know from the and In these we examples of relations that have to be as cannot simply be determined by the nature of their as we in there are relations, like different relata can be or in it is relations that are determined and the objects there is a of it may only be with if at that relations are dependent on and derivative of their relata. Della Rocca the of the specific to what to the that there is no to and that all of the are not and he seems to that only of the need to have a reason but not our always But an to infinite talking or to both of which Della Rocca's does not if and point into the of it is not so the of that needs a but the assumption of an and by