The Birth of State: Investigating South Sudan Secession and Motives of Great Powers for Strong Support

This study interrogates different domestic and international factors that lead to support for secessions. It questions why South Sudan’s secession was strongly supported by Western great powers. It uses realist theory and norms of sovereignty as an analytical conceptual framework for understanding the national interests of the Western great powers in supporting independence and conferring sovereignty. It argues that support for secessions and international recognition have more to do with the great powers’ own interests, particularly, the U.S., rather than the fulfillment of the criteria of international law. The analysis examines six competing arguments (hypotheses) such as: history of conflict; agreed framework and commitment of local population; compatible norms and internationalized ethnic politics; status of the mother state in the eyes of the international community; economic benefits, and security and stability interests in the case of South Sudan. A comparison of these hypotheses with the cases of Somaliland and Western Sahara shows that the unique case of support for South Sudan statehood was due to its long and bitter history of conflict, to compatible norms and internationalized ethnic politics-particularly with the U.S, as well as the diminished status of Sudan in the eyes of the international community, especially with regard to human rights violations in Darfur and the security and stability interests triggered by September 11<sup>th </sup>2001. The remaining two hypotheses, agreed framework and commitment of the local population, along with economic benefits, appear not to be unique to the case of South Sudan since the agreed framework was present for both South Sudan and Western Sahara and commitment of the local population was present in all three cases. The second factor (economic benefits) is particularly relevant to Western Sahara, since the U.S. and France have an interest in Morocco’s resources and hence are less interested in Saharawi’s independence.