The Dialectical Function of Names in the <i>Sophist</i>

Abstract Language plays a pivotal role in Plato’s Sophist . Scholarly attention has focused primarily on verbs, especially the verb “to be,” and on statements. In this paper, I take a step back and focus on names ( onomata ) to argue that the very act of attributing a name ( onomazein ) plays a crucial role in the dialectical enterprise. Specifically, I argue that in the so-called Outer Part of the Sophist , names ( onomata ) contribute (i) to determining the project of the Sophist , (ii) to understanding how the interlocutors aim to track down the sophist, and (iii) to making sense of the whole development of the search for the sophist. (i) I shall defend the claim that the Sophist and Statesman are to be understood as one answer to Socrates’ opening question as to whether each of the three terms “sophist,” “statesman,” and “philosopher” picks out a distinct genos (217a7–9). (ii) In order to distinguish each of the three terms from the others, the interlocutors employ the Method of Collection and Division, which has been variously interpreted in the secondary literature. By means of a close reading of a largely overlooked passage (i.e., Sph . 227a7–c6), I shall show that the act of naming has a unifying function and that Collection and Division aim to apprehend what is akin and what is not by considering all possible objects under scrutiny as equally worthy of investigation. I shall further show that we can rightly speak of Division and Collection , since there is Collection in the Outer Part of the Sophist . (iii) Finally, I shall show that the pattern that develops through the sequence of the Divisions moves backwards, making us go back to what has been said to be the only common ground of the joint inquiry, namely the name “sophist,” and to the very first assumption this name reveals, namely that the sophist must possess a technê because of his name.