Politics, Economic Interests and Filibustering: The Failure of the Spanish-German Treaty (1893)

This article studies the failure of the Spanish-German treaty signed in 1893. The examination of the process that led to its derailment in the Spanish senate contributes to the historiography in the following ways. First, the composition of the executive that promoted the agreement illustrates the fragility of the protectionist agro-industrial coalition, as shown for Germany, in late-nineteenth century Spain. Second, the non-ratification of this treaty qualifies the idea of an inactive Spanish Parliament, where policymaking was immune to the demands of pressure groups. Third, the new tactic implemented to hamper the treaty's ratification shows how Spain, even without a clear separation of powers in its political system, could resort to legislative practices which enabled Parliament to curtail the executive action. Finally, the German reaction to the eventual lack of ratification constitutes a good illustration of the new Chancellor Caprivi's strategy, which was the opposite of Bismarck's, in the field of international relations.

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Publication Details

Journal
European History Quarterly
Published
2025-03-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/02656914251324116
Primary Topic
European Political History Analysis
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Politics, Economic Interests and Filibustering: The Failure of the Spanish-German Treaty (1893)

Marcela Sabaté Sort, José María Serrano-Sanz
European History Quarterly
European Political History Analysis
article

Politics, Economic Interests and Filibustering: The Failure of the Spanish-German Treaty (1893)

Marcela Sabaté Sort, José María Serrano-Sanz
article en

Abstract

This article studies the failure of the Spanish-German treaty signed in 1893. The examination of the process that led to its derailment in the Spanish senate contributes to the historiography in the following ways. First, the composition of the executive that promoted the agreement illustrates the fragility of the protectionist agro-industrial coalition, as shown for Germany, in late-nineteenth century Spain. Second, the non-ratification of this treaty qualifies the idea of an inactive Spanish Parliament, where policymaking was immune to the demands of pressure groups. Third, the new tactic implemented to hamper the treaty's ratification shows how Spain, even without a clear separation of powers in its political system, could resort to legislative practices which enabled Parliament to curtail the executive action. Finally, the German reaction to the eventual lack of ratification constitutes a good illustration of the new Chancellor Caprivi's strategy, which was the opposite of Bismarck's, in the field of international relations.

European History QuarterlyVol. 55(2)
Universidad de Zaragoza (ES)
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
Openalex Percentile: Top 95%
European Political History Analysis
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