Hallmarks of deception in asset-exchange models

We investigate the transient and steady-state dynamics of the Bennati-Dragulescu-Yakovenko money game in the presence of probabilistic cheaters, who can misrepresent their financial status by claiming to have no money. We derive the steady-state wealth distribution per player analytically, and we show how the presence of hidden cheaters can be inferred from the relative variance of wealth per player. In scenarios with a finite number of cheaters amidst an infinite pool of honest players, we identify a critical probability of cheating at which the total wealth owned by the cheaters experiences a second-order discontinuity. Below this point, the transition probability to lose money is larger than the probability to gain; conversely, above this point, the direction is reversed. We further establish a threshold cheating probability at which cheaters collectively possess half of the total wealth in the game. Lastly, we provide bounds on the rate at which both cheaters and honest players can gain or lose wealth, contributing to a deeper understanding of deception in asset-exchange models.

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Publication Details

Journal
Physical Review Research
Published
2025-03-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1103/physrevresearch.7.013279
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Applications
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.11

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article

Hallmarks of deception in asset-exchange models

Kristian Blom, Dmitrii E. Makarov, Aljaž Godec
1 citations
Physical Review Research
Game Theory and Applications
2.11
article

Hallmarks of deception in asset-exchange models

Kristian Blom, Dmitrii E. Makarov, Aljaž Godec
article en
1 citations

Abstract

We investigate the transient and steady-state dynamics of the Bennati-Dragulescu-Yakovenko money game in the presence of probabilistic cheaters, who can misrepresent their financial status by claiming to have no money. We derive the steady-state wealth distribution per player analytically, and we show how the presence of hidden cheaters can be inferred from the relative variance of wealth per player. In scenarios with a finite number of cheaters amidst an infinite pool of honest players, we identify a critical probability of cheating at which the total wealth owned by the cheaters experiences a second-order discontinuity. Below this point, the transition probability to lose money is larger than the probability to gain; conversely, above this point, the direction is reversed. We further establish a threshold cheating probability at which cheaters collectively possess half of the total wealth in the game. Lastly, we provide bounds on the rate at which both cheaters and honest players can gain or lose wealth, contributing to a deeper understanding of deception in asset-exchange models.

Physical Review ResearchVol. 7(1)
Max Planck Institute for Multidisciplinary Sciences (DE), The University of Texas at Austin (US)
National Science Foundation, Welch Foundation, Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Openalex Percentile: Top 15%
Game Theory and Applications
2.11
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Hallmarks of deception in asset-exchange models — Kristian Blom, Dmitrii E. Makarov, et al. · Physical Review Research (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS