Does performance change budgets? Punctuated equilibrium, performance, and the budget for juvenile justice in an American state

Purpose How performance informs budgeting and budgets is contentious and unclear. Applying punctuated equilibrium theory, this research seeks to understand if performance information once placed on the media and macropolitical agendas can lead to long-term budgetary shifts. This research highlights how the accumulation of performance information punctuated the funding scheme and created a new equilibrium over time. Design/methodology/approach This research uses mixed methods to study the impact of performance on Florida’s (USA) Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) over a 20-year period. First, we conduct a media review of 400 randomly sampled newspaper articles to characterize the media discourse around the DJJ from 1999 to 2007. Second, we use interrupted time series analysis to test if the accumulation of performance information triggered a shift in state funding from failing punitive programs to promising diversionary and prevention programs. Findings The media review shows that reporting on the poor performance of punitive programs built up pressure for reform over the 1999–2007 period and attracted attention from political leaders. The interrupted time series shows that performance-informed reforms associated with the state’s Blueprint Commission rebalanced the DJJ’s policy and budgetary priorities to place less emphasis on punitive programs and more emphasis on diversionary and prevention programs. Originality/value While prior studies have focused on the impact of performance on managerial and budgetary behaviors, we demonstrate that performance information, and media attention to it, leads to meaningful, if not immediate, budgetary change.