In the Beginning, There Was Martial Law in the Republic of Korea 1948~1952

This paper analyzes the history and legal nature of martial law in the early Republic of Korea, focusing on how state violence was institutionalized and legally justified in the absence of formal martial law statutes. In particular, it examines the historical and legal essence of martial law against the backdrop of the failed attempt at a self-coup following the declaration of emergency martial law on December 3, 2024, which has sparked active debates on the unconstitutionality and illegality of martial law and emergency powers. The study begins with an analysis of martial law during the U.S. military government’s 1946 ‘October Uprising’, the ‘Yeosu-Suncheon Incident’, and the ‘Jeju 4·3 Incident’, exploring the process through which martial law legislation emerged and its legal and political implications. Additionally, it investigates the interaction between presidential emergency orders and martial law during the Korean War, shedding light on how emergency powers facilitated large-scale civilian massacres and internal violence.<br/>This paper argues that martial law was not merely an emergency measure but a tool for legally legitimizing and institutionalizing state violence. Using the December 3 emergency martial law declaration as a reference point, it highlights the need for legal and institutional reforms to address the fundamental flaws of emergency powers. Finally, the study reflects on the historical lessons of martial law and state violence while exploring pathways toward a system that upholds democracy and human rights.