One another’s equals? Humanity and the state in international theory

The concept of the person is ubiquitously used in international theory, most prominently to attribute a certain character to human beings and states. While it features in discussions of how best to analyze state behavior, as well as being essential in characterizing human beings and states as subjects of international law, it is also used to answer one of international theory’s core normative questions: who in the world of international relations deserves moral consideration? This article highlights a central problem with how this concept is used in normative international theory. It argues that, since it is used to ground the moral standing of both human beings and states, it becomes remarkably difficult to deny that they should be recognized as one another’s equals, which means that normative international theorists will also find it exceedingly challenging to defend the moral priority of one over the other. The main upshot of this argument is twofold. Demonstrating the flaws of the main attempts to escape this impasse, the article establishes a serious problem with one of the main conceptual tools in the toolkit of normative international theory. But since the normatively untenable state of the equality between human beings and states only follows from the dependence upon this concept, the article also showcases where an escape route should more plausibly begin. The article thus ends by suggesting how normative international theory can free itself from its dependence on the concept of the person.