Saudi Arabia and Iran: Spoilers or Enablers of Conflict?

Abstract Saudi Arabia and Iran played roles, inadvertently or not, in enabling the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel in October 2023. Before the war that ensued, Tehran aided and funded Hamas and its military wing, the Izz al‐Din al‐Qassam Brigades. Riyadh shunned the group by arresting and extraditing its members in a bid to join the US‐backed Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel, a move that could lead to alliances to contain Iran. The Hamas assault thwarted the Saudi‐Israeli normalization plans, at least in the short term, and gave Iran a chance to engage with the kingdom. The Islamic Republic urged Saudi Arabia to spoil the war by supporting a quick ceasefire, which could have enabled Hamas to regroup when Israeli forces advanced into Gaza. This article shows that the niche diplomacy to halt the fighting exposed the lurking rivalries and limited capabilities of Iran and Saudi Arabia. By not seeking a permanent solution to build peace or subvert the cyclical nature of the most enduring conflict in the Middle East, between Israel and Palestine, Saudi Arabia and Iran were sidelined by the United States when it built the first phase of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas by mid‐January 2025.

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Publication Details

Journal
Middle East Policy
Published
2025-03-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12808
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
8.40
Controls
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article

Saudi Arabia and Iran: Spoilers or Enablers of Conflict?

Banafsheh Keynoush
2 citations
Middle East Policy
Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts
8.40
article

Saudi Arabia and Iran: Spoilers or Enablers of Conflict?

Banafsheh Keynoush
article en
2 citations

Abstract

Abstract Saudi Arabia and Iran played roles, inadvertently or not, in enabling the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel in October 2023. Before the war that ensued, Tehran aided and funded Hamas and its military wing, the Izz al‐Din al‐Qassam Brigades. Riyadh shunned the group by arresting and extraditing its members in a bid to join the US‐backed Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel, a move that could lead to alliances to contain Iran. The Hamas assault thwarted the Saudi‐Israeli normalization plans, at least in the short term, and gave Iran a chance to engage with the kingdom. The Islamic Republic urged Saudi Arabia to spoil the war by supporting a quick ceasefire, which could have enabled Hamas to regroup when Israeli forces advanced into Gaza. This article shows that the niche diplomacy to halt the fighting exposed the lurking rivalries and limited capabilities of Iran and Saudi Arabia. By not seeking a permanent solution to build peace or subvert the cyclical nature of the most enduring conflict in the Middle East, between Israel and Palestine, Saudi Arabia and Iran were sidelined by the United States when it built the first phase of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas by mid‐January 2025.

Middle East PolicyVol. 32(1)
United States Institute of Peace (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts
8.40
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