Interest Group Coalitions in the States

ABSTRACT Objective This article explores coalition joining among interest groups in the American states. The article seeks to fill gaps in the literature, foremost among them the lack of research on interest group coalitions in the American states. Methods The article draws on a new dataset based on a survey of over 2000 lobbyists in all 50 American states to reach conclusions about interest group coalition joining in the American states. Results Our descriptive analyses show that coalitions tend to be small (10 groups or less), that groups belong to both short‐ and long‐term coalitions, and that groups join coalitions because they think it helps them win. Our multivariate analyses show that (1) facing powerful opposition is the best predictor of the number of coalitions a group joins and (2) groups that join a relatively large number of coalitions see themselves as more powerful than those that do not. Conclusions The data point to a number of conclusions, including the following: (1) joining other groups in coalitions is a nearly universal interest group lobbying tactic in the American states; (2) groups join coalitions because they think there is strength in numbers; (3) positive coalitional lobbying (joining a coalition to get something adopted) is more common than negative coalitional lobbying (joining a coalition to stop something from getting adopted); and (4) facing powerful opposition increases the chances that a group will join a coalition.