Comparative Study of Double Auction Markets under Different Auction Rules

As an important market mechanism, double auctions are widely applied in complex markets such as finance and energy. The design of auction rules significantly impacts market efficiency, fairness, and resource allocation. This paper focuses on two typical auction rules: uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing. It compares and analyzes their characteristics and market performance from price discovery efficiency, resource allocation efficiency, and market transparency perspectives. This paper uses the German electricity market and the Shanghai license plate auction to validate the theoretical analysis as case studies. Through an in-depth analysis of these two markets, this study demonstrates the applicability and limitations of uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing under different market environments. The results show that uniform pricing, with its single equilibrium price, improves market transparency and fairness, making it suitable for markets that prioritize price stability and efficiency. In contrast, discriminatory pricing caters to individualized needs through differentiated pricing but may face challenges in transparency and fairness due to strategic behaviors and price dispersion. This study provides theoretical support and practical insights for optimizing rule design in double auction markets.