SPSE-AP: A Lightweight Security Authentication Protocol for SRAM PUF Space Expansion
As a lightweight hardware security primitive, SRAM PUF generates keys for IoT authentication but is limited by its small Challenge-Response Pair (CRP) space, restricting the number of authentications. To address this, we propose SPSE-AP, a security authentication protocol designed for SRAM PUF Space Expansion. SPSE-AP expands CRPs during registration by randomly accessing data in SRAM and further increases authentication instances using splitting, permutation, and sampling in the authentication phase. Security analysis shows that SPSE-AP effectively defends against various attacks on SRAM PUF, achieving an average overhead of only 31.8% compared to similar protocols while using only hash functions for compression.
Authors
- Zhenyu Wang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9815-8775)
- Yang Zhang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3111-1534)
- Xiaowen Chen (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4029-1805)
- Zhenyu Zhao (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0007-9019-1195)
- Xing Hu
Institutions
- National University of Defense Technology (CN)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2024-12-13
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/icftic64248.2024.10912913
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00