Beyond “moral progress”: A dual‐character conception of moral change

Abstract Philosophers who study moral progress often hold a largely unacknowledged conception of moral history, which one may call the problem‐solving conception of moral progress . This conception pictures humans as problem solvers, who make progress by advancing morally significant values in society. This conception, however, overlooks the conflict of values. In response, this paper proposes the dual‐character conception of moral change to guide the study of the historical change of morality. This conception tracks a self‐limiting structure of moral change—since not all values are compatible and combinable, our efforts to actualize certain values entail our neglect and sacrifice of alternative values. In consequence, the “progress” we make actually limits us from experimenting with other ideal forms of life and society. As calling a change process progress keeps us in a state of neglecting alternative values, we should discard the moral‐progress thinking and stay aware of the limitations of our moral efforts.