Incremental lobbying reform: the patchy case of Italy

Abstract The regulation of lobbying serves the dual ambition of ensuring a level playing field for participation in policymaking while reducing risks of corruption and undue influence. International organisations, such as the EU, OECD and Council of Europe, have promoted this regulation by relying on such different agendas and frames. This variation is magnified within the Italian political system, where registers have been introduced in several institutions such as the Chamber of Deputies (Lower House), three ministries, and seven regions. By distinguishing two models of lobbying regulation, we trace the evolution of successive adoptions at the national and regional levels, characterised by the interplay between international organisations, domestic agenda-setting events and domestic policy entrepreneurs. The first group of lobbying regulation adopters concern what we define as the ‘participation agenda’, composed of voluntary rules and weak provisions for restricting legislator–lobbyist interactions. Following a sequence of influence-peddling scandals and the emergence of anti-corruption policy, a second wave of rules adoption reflects the ‘integrity agenda’ with a focus on mandatory registration requirements, disclosure requirements, and provisions on conflict-of-interest prevention. We observe that the sequence of adoptions is not separated and independent but rather characterised by policy layering whereby integrity instruments of the second period of adoption are added on to the participation goals of the first historical period.