The Potential for Changing Public Perceptions on Climate Change Through Narratives

The United Nations classifies anthropogenic climate change as the “biggest threat modern humans have ever faced” (United Nations 2021). Yet domestic and international actions are inadequate to curb its worst impacts. Not only are countries failing to live up to the goals they set at the 2015 Paris Climate Accord, but even these aims fall short of what is required to prevent widespread disaster and massive suffering (Mulvaney 2021; United Nations 2021). In the United States specifically, the lack of political will to fight climate change is rooted in a corresponding lack of urgency among the public (S. Moser 2009). Over the last decade, rates of acceptance of climate change among American adults have slowly but consistently increased. In 2010, 57% of Americans believed the climate was changing, 48% accepted that it was human caused, and 33% of people thought there was scientific consensus on the issue. Ten years later, in 2020, 73% of Americans believed climate change was occurring, 60% accepted that it was human caused, and 57% recognized the scientific consensus on the issue (Ballew et al. 2019). However, severe political partisanship remains, with 86% of liberal Democrats and 75% of conservative or moderate Democrats accepting the veracity of anthropogenic climate change compared to only 27% of conservative Republicans and 48% of liberal or moderate Republicans who accept the same (Ballew et al. 2019). Recent work by political scientist Matthew Motta uses data from three survey-based studies (Pew Research, Cooperative Congressional Election Study, and Yale Climate Change Communication) to show that this slow change in perspective does not reflect the changing of hearts and minds of the American public but rather an increase in political progressivism among millennials as they age (Motta 2021). Motta calls this the “Changing Samples Model,” demonstrating that what we see as a change in perceptions of climate change is actually an increase in ideological liberalism and educational attainment among young adults (Motta 2021). In contrast, the Yale Project on Climate Change Communication (YPCCC) paints a different picture of shifting climate change perceptions. In their work, they identify six groups of Americans based on their perceptions of climate change (A. Leiserowitz et al. 2021). The YPCCC team tracks these groups and perceptions over time. In the four years between 2017 and 2021, they found that 15% of people increased their concern regarding climate change (A. Leiserowitz et al. 2021). Thus, despite Motta's (2021) contention that changing perceptions on climate change reflect “changing samples,” the YPCCC findings that 15% of the voting public did change their perspectives over 4 years indicates the imperative need for additional scholarship on climate change perceptions and their variations over time. In the United States, like several other early industrialized countries, climate change remains a politically divisive and emotionally charged topic, making it ripe for mis/disinformation and information avoidance. Despite its entrenched nature, environmental sociology tells us that personal experience can increase one's environmental concern and acceptance of climate change (Haltinner et al. 2022). Given the limitations inherent in exposing every American to direct personal experience through environmental disaster, we turn to research in ecocriticism, narratology, and media studies to explore the ways that immersive narratives (e.g., fictional stories, fictional films, documentaries), interactive narratives (e.g., virtual and augmented reality), and productive narratives (telling and/or writing stories) can be used to mimic the impacts of personal experience on climate perceptions. In short, our essay draws on these various branches of scholarly work to assess whether, how, and why simulated experiences with climate disasters via diverse media may alter beliefs and decision-making regarding climate change and present a road map to mobilizing American public resolve to demand action on the climate crisis. Given the heightened political topic in this country, and the fact that much of the existing scholarship on the relationship between environmentalism and personal experience that we draw on was conducted in the United States, our focus for this paper is on the potential for narrative to be used to shift perceptions of climate change in this context. Given the extreme nature of current American politics as they relate to climate change, it is likely that these practices may also be effective in less divisive or politicized climates. People dislike emotional discomfort. As a result, in the face of information that evokes significant anxiety or fear, some people1 might avoid learning about or engaging with a given topic (Shepherd and Kay 2012). Instead, they may choose to remain ignorant and displace their concern with confidence in a powerful entity that they entrust to solve the problem (Shepherd and Kay 2012). In some cases this further leads to adherence to conspiracy theories to explain away frightening stimuli (Haltinner and Sarathchandra 2018). Given the expansive, complex, and frightening nature of the climate crisis, climate change is ripe for this type of ignorance or denial (Haltinner and Sarathchandra 2018). While recent work suggests that some variants of fear, particularly worry, might avoid the short-term “amygdala hijack” that leads to avoidance, disengagement, doubt, or dismissal (Smith and Leiserwitz 2014; K. Haltinner, Ladino, and Sarathchandra 2021), most scholarship finds that people respond to their emotive discomfort about climate change by intentionally avoiding the problem and either becoming immobilized (Lertzman 2015; Norgaard 2011), shifting trust and responsibility to a larger, perceptively more powerful entity (such as scientists), or dismissing climate change as a conspiracy (Haltinner and Sarathchandra 2018). Surprisingly, the more information people have about climate change and/or the greater trust they have in scientists, the less individual responsibility they feel for ameliorating the problem (Krosnick et al. 2006; Kellstedt, Zahran, and Vedlitz 2008). For others, who dismiss climate change as a conspiracy, doing so can redirect any associated angst into ire at those responsible for the deception (Haltinner and Sarathchandra 2021). In addition to information avoidance driven by fear, political identities also influence climate change attitudes, risk perceptions, and behaviors. Democrats are more likely to affirm the reality of anthropogenic climate change and policies to address it, while Republicans have generally voiced skepticism and opposed such policies (McCright and Dunlap 2011). Prior research has noted that the public's understanding of climate change science is limited by the complexity of climate science (Sundblad, Biel, and Garling 2009). People thus rely on messaging from leaders in their political party to shape their climate change attitudes (Unsworth and Fielding 2014). The messaging of party leaders appears to reflect differences in ideological worldviews, which influences how Republicans and Democrats assess climate change risk (Fielding and Hornsey 2016; D. M. Kahan et al. 2012; McCright and Dunlap 2011). For instance, Republican leaders transmit ideological narratives that place greater trust in unregulated commerce and industry (McCright and Dunlap 2011). As such, they are more skeptical of climate change prevalence and risk, since solutions are often perceived to entail policies threatening to their ideological worldview (i.e., economic regulation). These ideological messages are not simply heuristic devices to enhance understanding of political and social issues. They also operate on a normative level, dictating the appropriate beliefs for group member identity (D. Kahan 2010). These identity-based forces are so prominent they appear to shape the effects of well-known general predictors of climate change skepticism. For instance, climate change denial is often linked to the challenges in understanding the phenomenon of climate change, including the extent to which it is occurring, is anthropogenic, and is a threat to humanity (Weber and Stern 2011). Thus, scientific literacy and knowledge about climate change are viewed as important predictors of climate change belief. However, Kahan and colleagues (2012) find that people with greater levels of scientific literacy are most polarized in their attitudes about climate change, a difference driven by identity dynamics. Specifically, Kahan and colleagues (2012) conclude that among people with a hierarchical worldview, generally trusting of unregulated industry and commerce, scientific literacy increases climate change skepticism (measured as low perceived risk); while among people with an egalitarian and communitarian worldview, distrustful of unregulated industry and commerce, scientific literacy decreases climate change skepticism. This suggests that people are psychologically inclined to accept only those studies that affirm the beliefs of their larger political group, the consequences of which can be dangerous when dealing with a potentially existential issue. Political identities have been shown to impact the development of other categorical identities that influence climate change skepticism. Veldman (2019); Veldman and colleagues (2021) examine how the evangelical Christian community has embraced the Republican Party and conservative movement over the past 50 years. Conservative beliefs such as climate change skepticism have been incorporated into this group's religious identity, thus affording them a sacred status. Similarly, Grindal and colleagues (2023) suggest that, for white people, racial identity development entails exploring conservative political contexts which affirm the value of their racial group and may increase their likelihood of holding beliefs like climate change skepticism. Another branch of research has found that climate change skepticism can itself be the basis for a political identity, or an opinion-based social identity (Bliuc et al. 2015; McGarty 2009; Sarathchandra, Haltinner, and Grindal 2022). These identities help unite climate change skeptics who may not share a common categorical identity. Recent work finds that these identities are particularly prone to intergroup tension, with climate change skeptics exhibiting anger toward climate change believers (Bliuc et al. 2015) and distrust of climate change scientists (Sarathchandra, Haltinner, and Grindal 2022), both of whom they perceive to be outgroup threats. Climate change skepticism, then, is a particularly sticky fear, worry, and which people to their in the and avoid or learning about the crisis. In climate change has with political and religious identities making it a particularly and identity for Given the that climate change into and sticky it is particularly important to to people to information on this issue. 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