Dynamic Defense Method Against Malicious Attacks for DC Microgrids

DC microgrids can significantly benefit from the implementation of distributed communication and control, but these advancements also increase susceptibility to malicious attacks. To address these concerns, this article proposes a defense method to resist malicious attacks, including false data injection attacks (FDIAs) and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. The proposed method includes two key strategies. To resist FDIAs, a strategy is employed that involves dynamically removing security data-assisted equivalence relations. The equivalence relations can detect FDIAs and compute mitigation vectors to eliminate their adverse effects. In addition, the dynamic removal of security data strategy reduces the computational burden and improves the computational efficiency of the dc microgrid. In response to DoS attacks, a weighted average estimation method is proposed. Subsequently, the estimated current values are transmitted to the controller to ensure the stability of the dc microgrid. Finally, simulation results on dc microgrid clusters demonstrate the validity of the proposed defense method.