How to Address the Saudi Nuclear Program? An Israeli Dilemma

Abstract Normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia is part of a three‐way negotiation that would allow the United States to prevent further erosion of its regional standing and to contain Iran. However, Israeli politicians and security experts object to the potential deal's allowing a Saudi route to military nuclear capabilities. They criticize the Netanyahu government for failing to require conditioning US‐Saudi nuclear cooperation on the kingdom's agreement to forgo the domestic enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel. Such processes, if misused, could yield military‐grade fissile material. I argue that Israeli experts are wrong to assume Riyadh has no alternatives to nuclear cooperation with the United States and should rethink their stances against enrichment and reprocessing in Saudi Arabia, even in American‐run facilities. Rejecting this option could benefit China and Russia, which have already proposed building Saudi Arabia's first nuclear power plant. Unlike Washington, Beijing and Moscow may not force the Saudis to accept restrictions beyond their obligations under the Non‐Proliferation Treaty and give up their right to domestic enrichment and reprocessing. To support my argument, I examine the US‐Iran nuclear dialogue of the 1970s, China's and Russia's proliferation policies, Saudi‐Pakistani relations, and the Atomic Energy Act—elements upon which Israeli experts base their claims.