Reforming the position of the coalition and opposition in the Indonesian constitutional system

This study seeks to evaluate the roles of the coalition and opposition within the Indonesian constitutional framework as established by the 1945 Constitution, and to investigate the impact of political dynamics between the two on the efficacy of legislative supervision of the executive branch. In Indonesia's multiparty presidential system, the presence of a dominating coalition and a feeble opposition poses significant obstacles to upholding the notion of checks and balances. This study employs a normative legal research method using a normative descriptive approach to delineate the notion and status of coalition and opposition, alongside a juridical-analytical methodology to assess the legal and practical impediments impacting the efficacy of legislative oversight. Primary legal documents, including the 1945 Constitution, pertinent laws, and Constitutional Court rulings, are utilized in conjunction with secondary legal materials such as scholarly literature and comparative analyses of political systems in other nations. The findings indicated that while the 1945 Constitution did not expressly delineate the structure and function of coalitions and oppositions, political practice in Indonesia revealed a tendency for coalitions to prevail, whilst oppositions were frequently disjointed and less efficacious. This undermines the parliamentary scrutiny of executive policy, which frequently serves just as a formality. The formal regulation of the opposition's role, the enhancement of legislative ability, and the streamlining of the election system are the principal recommendations to enhance this political dynamic. The study's conclusion affirms the necessity of political and legal reforms to guarantee that democracy in Indonesia adheres to the principles of popular sovereignty and governmental accountability.