Gadamer’s Ambivalent Aristotelianism and the Critique of Theôria Before Warheit Und Methode

Abstract: This article attempts to show a neglected aspect of Gadamer’s appropriation of Aristotle and to provide an interpretation of that aspect that explains it. The author argues that, at least up until Wahrheit und Methode (1960), Gadamer appropriates Aristotle’s practical philosophy while criticizing central notions and parts of Aristotle’s theoretical philosophy. His claim is that this feature—visible in Wahrheit und Methode —can be adequately understood only on the basis of the critique of Aristotelian θεωρία that Garamer articulates in his earlier writings on Aristotle. This critique, the author contends, is closely connected to another dialogue that was always crucial for Gadamer, namely the mutual explanation he had with Heidegger’s critique of Greek metaphysics.