Pleasure, Pain, and Desire: Epistemology and Ontology of Mental States in <i>Kalām</i>

Abstract This article addresses the primary arguments, concepts, and methods associated with the philosophical analysis of mental states in classical kalām. My discussion will be based on the analysis of pleasure and pain, as well as desire and aversion. These two closely related pairs serve as perfect examples of kalām strategies in the philosophy of mind. We will see that scholars of kalām commonly rely on direct, either phenomenal or empirical, observations to identify the reality of mental states. Once the reality of mental states is established, a scholar of kalām typically engages in a discussion of their ontology, enquiring whether there is a certain separate entity (maʿnā) behind the mental phenomenon or the sensible perception in question and whether it gives rise to a non-perceptible state (ḥāl) that belongs to the entire individual. Among the results of this study is a hypothesis that the methods and concepts of kalām philosophy of mind (particularly the Muʿtazilī tradition) influenced post-Avicennan post-classical Islamic philosophy, particularly Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210).