Higher-Order Time Sharing Masking
At CHES 2024, Time Sharing Masking (TSM) was introduced as a novel low-latency masking technique for hardware circuits. TSM offers area and randomness efficiency, as well as glitch-extended PINI security, but it is limited to first-order security. We address this limitation and generalize TSM to higher-order security while maintaining all of TSM’s advantages. Additionally, we propose an area-latency tradeoff. We prove HO-TSM glitch-extended PINI security and successfully evaluate our circuits using formal verification tools. Furthermore, we demonstrate area- and latency-efficient implementations of the AES S-box, which do not exhibit leakage in TVLA on FPGA. Our proposed tradeoff enables a first-order secure implementation of a complete AES-128 encryption core with 92 kGE, 920 random bits per round, and 20 cycles of latency, which does not exhibit leakage in TVLA on FPGA.
Authors
- Benedikt Gierlichs (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5866-1990)
- Siemen Dhooghe (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0591-7355)
- Josep Balasch (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6066-8710)
- Ingrid Verbauwhede (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0879-076X)
- Dilip Kumar S. V.
Institutions
- KU Leuven (BE)
Publication Details
- Journal
- IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Published
- 2025-03-04
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2025.i2.235-267
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00