The Political Economy of High‐Skilled Immigration: Analyzing (Co)Sponsorship on High‐Skilled Immigration Bills in the U.S. Congress

ABSTRACT What drives politicians' support for high‐skilled immigration policy? I argue that politicians support different types of high‐skilled immigration policy by balancing business demand for skilled foreign labor and their party's position toward immigration. Using high‐skilled immigration bills, (co)sponsorship data, and H‐1B visa applications from 2003 to 2020 in the U.S., I find that business demand affects politicians' behavior differently depending on the type of immigration bills, which I categorize as expanding, zero‐sum, and restrictive. Expanding bills increase high‐skilled immigration, thereby increasing the total number of immigrants, whereas zero‐sum bills increase it at the expense of other types of immigration. Restrictive bills strengthen monitoring processes to reduce skilled immigration. Business demand plays a significant role when the nature of immigration bills aligns closely with their party's position for Democratic representatives, as in the case of expanding bills. On the other hand, for Republican representatives, business demand wields greater influence when the nature of immigration bills deviates from their party's stance, as in the case of restrictive bills. Business demand does not strongly affect the support for zero‐sum bills. By highlighting business demand and partisanship, this paper provides insights into the competitive dynamics among legislators regarding different types of high‐skill immigration policies.