Expectations about nonhuman intelligences: Fermi’s challenge, divine hiddenness, and the White House lawn

Why are scientists so often dismissive of UAP studies? Part of the answer to this question must acknowledge common arguments for disbelief in flying saucers. One such argument appeals to the incompatibility between the behavior we would expect to see from nonhuman intelligences, and what we actually see. I argue that common variations of this line of reasoning are unsound. There are strong similarities between three arguments: the argument suggested by the Fermi paradox, the argument suggested by the question of why UAP do not land on the White House lawn, and the atheistic argument suggested by the problems of evil and divine hiddenness. A standard response to the atheistic argument, which is well-known in the philosophical literature, carries over to the other two arguments. In sections 2 through 4, I present each of the three arguments, and I demonstrate their similarities. In section 5, I present a standard philosophical rebuttal to the problem of divine hiddenness. In section 6, I demonstrate how this rebuttal applies at least as well to both of the other arguments. In the final section, I discuss some upshots of this result. The primary upshot is that a common reason for serious scientists not to take UAP studies seriously rests on a bad argument.